with important interests demanding protection and urgent problens calling for solution. It is melancholy to have to report that they failed miserably, but the causes of this failure are not far to seek, Authority is divided between the Chiang Chun and the Civil Governor, and the jealously normally existing between them was turned into an open quarrel by the action of the Central Government in transferring the control of the gendarmerie from the latter to the former. Both, moreover, are liable to constant interference from the State Council and from the various boards in Peking. This was especially noticeable in the case of the Board of Communications. The employés of this board appear to come from a class which is entirely self-seeking and devoid of patriotism and, as in Turkey, they are easily seduced by the arts of which the Germans are such past masters. The higher provincial officials were not at all so amenable to German influence, but they seemed to have little to say in the management of the Tien-tsin- Pukow Railway, with the result that for several weeks after the outbreak of war the Germans, besi les absolutely controlling the Shantung Railway, were able to use the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway almost as they pleased. A long list of breaches of neutrality could be compiled if necessary. The most flagrant cases, however, were the return of the Austrian crew of the "Kaiserin Elizabeth" from Tien-tsin, and the conveyance by the German consul at Nanking of two boxes containing munitions of war-believed to be mines-to Tsingtao. The authorities at Tsinan had ample warning with regard to these boxes but did nothing so that, with the active assistance of German employés of the Tien-tsin-Pukow Railway, they were safely conveyed to the station of the Shantung Railway and thence to Tsingtao.
The Japanese, who were chiefly concerned, took no serious steps with regard to these breaches of neutrality, and were probably secretly pleased, for reasons of their own, that they should occur. As no British interests seemed to be involved I confined myself to offering friendly advice to the Chinese as occasion served. At an early stage I warned the Chiang Chun that the free use of the Shantung Railway might justify a belligerent in seizing the whole line. He was evidently afraid to assert any rights over this line, and I therefore suggested that he might at all events cut the connection between the Shantung and the Tien-tsin Railways and thus minimise the danger of abuses, but he was unable to adopt so drastic a measure on his own responsibility. On another occasion I suggested to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs that neutrality would be better preserved if British officials from the southern section of the Tien-tsin- Pukow Railway were allowed to function as far north as Tsinan in lieu of German employés. He submitted the suggestion to the directors of the railway, who returned a blank refusal. Thus, partly through indecision, and partly through corruption, the Chinese failed to avert the Japanese occupation of the railway, though the danger was plain from the beginning.
The same indecision was seen in the handling of the Chinese troops in Shantung. The Chiang Chun early suspected that the Japanese might land at Lungkow, and therefore drafted large bodies of troops into the east of the province. When the Japanese came, however, the troops in obedience to orders from Peking were all withdrawn to Wei-hsien. The principal anxiety of the Chinese then became to prevent the Japanese advancing west of Wei-hsien, and they thought this object had been achieved when, with the consent of Japan, a war zone was marked out running cast of that place. They were, therefore, all the more surprised and chagrined when a Japanese detachment seized the Wei-hsien railway station. Reinforcements amounting to about 2,000 men were hurriedly sent to Wei-hsien, but this was a foolish and inpolitic move as there was never any real intention of opposing the Japanese by force. The best that can be said for the Chinese is that their decision not to fight was at any rate a wise one.
The formal determination of the status of the Japanese in Shantung must await the fall of Tsingtao, but there is no question that, at the very least, they have succeeded in full to the position hitherto held by the Germans. In this connection I am able to relate an interesting piece of secret history. When the Shantung Railway was completed the Chinese cast about for some inethod of rescuing the province from the grip of the Germans. One expedient was to open Tsinan to foreign trade and residence, a measure which subsequently achieved much success. Yang Shih-hsiang, who succeeded Yuan Shih-kai as Viceroy of Chibli and was at that time Governor of Shantung, conceived the brilliant idea of inviting in the Japanese as a counterpoise to the Germans. A plot in the settlement was granted on fifty years' lease (instead of thirty years, as provided in the regulations) for a Japanese consulate, and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha were allowed to reserve a plot on the understanding that no rent should be paid till they actually built on it. This plot in defiance of the regulations-still
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stands empty in the busiest part of the settlement. Many small Japanese traders flocked into Tsinan in response to the Governor's invitation and opened shops in the city, where they were a thorn in the side of the officials, and now, finally, by the irony of fate, the Japanese have ousted the Germans altogether, and are likely to prove by far the harder taskmasters of the two. There is every likelihood that Eastern Shantung will become another South Manchuria, and British trade interests (which are rapidly increasing in importance in this province) view the prospect with much uneasiness. The British-American Tobacco Company have been the principal sufferers in the past from unfair Japanese competition, and I understand that they are considering steps to meet the present situation.
With regard to the conduct of Japanese troops in Shantung, full evidence is not yet available, but I think the following are just conclusions: The soldiers have been under good discipline and Japan has been anxious that they should behave well, but the Japanese soldier and subordinate officer is frequently an overbearing bully who shoots first and enquires afterwards. There have consequently been many cases of wanton killing of Chinese. Moreover, the troops have been billeted in Chinese houses, with the inevitable result that women have been raped. On the other hand, this crime, when detected, has been punished with instant death. For this I have the word of an Englishman who saw a Japanese soldier summarily shot for interfering with a Chinese woman. The stories spread by the Germans about the Japanese are, of course, outrageous lies, but their only result seems to have been to cause a stupid panic among their own women and children. On the other hand, reports in English newspapers have in some cases been too favourable, chiefly because the Japanese, with great skill, allowed English journalists to see only what they were intended to see.
Many wealthy Chinese fled from the war zone on the arrival of the Japanese, and of course suffered much thereby. The poorer classes had to stay, but I think it is fair to assume that, individual cases apart, they have benefited on the whole by the arrival in their midst of large numbers of troops with money to spend.
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Tsinan, in common with other places, is enjoying the benefits of a German press campaign. When war broke out Herr Ballin's blackmailing news factory was not in working order in Shantung. The German community therefore decided to subscribe to Reuter's telegrams, and at my invitation the rest of the foreign commanity and the Chinese officials agreed to join, with the result that I found myself charged with the laborious task of receiving the telegrams and typing and distributing copies to nearly forty subscribers. A few days later the German organisation got to work. The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank received telegrams which were posted up in Chinese outside its gates, and a German commercial paper printed in Chinese in Shanghai, the "Hsieh Ho Pao," published a daily broadsheet in Tsinan, reproducing these telegrams and other news translated from the German press. Efforts were made both by the bank and the German consul to induce the Governor to pass on the bank's telegrams to the native press.
This he stoutly refused to do, and indeed at first the native press were reluctant to publish the telegrams at all, and applied to me for the Renter's instead. Subsequently they published both sets of telegrams, and, acting on official instructions, endeavoured to show no partiality for either. Meanwhile for several weeks the Germans showed much activity in posting up the " Hsieh Ho Pao war news sheet all over the city, but, about the time of the German retreat from before Paris this activity slackened, and it was only to be found in German shops and hotels. At about the same time the Japanese produced a broadsheet, the "Chi Lu Jih Pao," and proved themselves much more efficient at this kind of organisation than the Germans. The Hsieh Ho Pao" merely slavishly translated all that appeared in the German newspapers for European consumption, but the Japanese takes pains to publish what is chiefly of interest to Chinese readers, and the "Ch'i Lu Jih Pao is still widely placarded all over Tsinan and in the towns along the Shantung Railway,
At the end of August the Germans refused in a body to continue their subscrip- tions to Reuter's telegrams, but as it was of great importance that there should be a supply of news other than from polluted German sources, I induced many of the up-country mission stations to subscribe, and was thus able to keep up the service. Up to the present, therefore, I continue to supply practically all the British and American communities in Shantung, as well as the Chinese officials and newspapers in Tsinan, with Reuter's telegrams. The task is extremely irksome and laborious, but it is important that it should not be allowed to drop.
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It is satisfactory to be able to report that the province, in spite of war and floods, still remains completely tranquil, and is, indeed, normally free from brigandage a state of things for which the local officials deserve much credit. Provincial finances have
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